INTRODUCTION

S
ince the 1920s, a number of scholars (e.g., Howells 1928; Sinclair 1928; Argyle 1958) have claimed that there is an inverse relationship between intelligence and religious belief (both of which have been variously defined). In an effort to explain this posited correlation, they have defended the intelligence-religiosity nexus (IRN) theory (Nyborg 2009 ), which holds that higher intelligence confers a greater ability to apprehend the assumed irrationality of religious belief.
Whereas IRN research has traditionally explored individual differences in religious belief, recent studies (Meisenberg 2007; Lynn, Harvey, and Nyborg 2009 ) have adopted countries as the unit of analysis. Lynn, Harvey, and Nyborg's (2009) findings reveal a positive correlation between national average intelligence and atheism (understood in this paper as disbelief in a God or gods). Several potential explanations are offered for this observed relationship, all of which presuppose the irrationality of such belief.
This study presents quantitative evidence that challenges these crossnational findings, especially those of Lynn, Harvey, and Nyborg (2009) . It is argued that higher education in free societies brings greater exposure to and eases the acceptance of such unconventional views as atheism. This exposure, in and of itself, increases the likelihood that one will reject belief in God. In addition, this study draws on the Christian ascetic tradition to argue that materialism also leads to higher levels of disbelief.
1 OLS regression analysis of 99 countries supports both theories, while revealing no evidence of an inverse link between intelligence and theism. Findings also show that disbelief is significantly lower in countries that are traditionally Roman Catholic, as well as in those that have not experienced prolonged communist rule.
The next section provides a critical review of the IRN literature, with special focus on Lynn, Harvey, and Nyborg's (2009) cross-national work. Following a discussion on the literature's serious theoretical and methodological flaws, alternative perspectives on the correlates of disbelief are offered. The research design and statistical methods employed in this study are then elaborated. After this study's findings are presented, their theoretical implications are considered. The final section consists of a summary and suggestions for further research.
THE INTELLIGENCE-THEISM NEXUS THEORY:
A CRITIQUE
The term "IQ" (intelligence quotient) has been used to describe overall scores on various standardized tests of verbal and/or nonverbal intelligence (Neisser 1996: 78) . The conventional practice is to take the scores of a reference sample of test takers, weight them, add them up and transform them to fit a Gaussian probability distribution (the bell-shaped curve), with a fixed mean IQ of 100 and standard deviation of 15. The reference sample is supposed to be representative: In essence, the scores of later test takers are computed by seeing where their raw scores fall in the distribution of the reference sample and reading off the corresponding Gaussian value. (Shalizi 2009: 244) To be sure, the psychometric study of intelligence is not without controversy. Some (e.g., Gould 1996) have questioned the treatment of intelligence as a one-dimensional entity that can be quantifiably measured. It has also been shown (e.g., Verney et al. 2005 , Cronshaw et al. 2006 ) that some IQ tests contain biases that reduce their validity as measures of cognitive ability for certain minority groups. Regarding the genetic aspect of intelligence, some have ridiculed the "unbroken chain of excessive heritability claims for 'intelligence,' which IQ tests are supposed to 'measure,'" and believe that these arguments are not worthy of further attention (Schöne-mann 1997) .
Even more questionable are recent attempts to differentiate among countries according to their average IQ (intelligence quotient) scores (e.g., see Richardson 2004) . One outstanding issue is that of ecological inference, the practice of drawing conclusions about individuals from nationally-aggregated data. On the one hand, the individual is the theoretical unit of analysis. On the other, the data are collected at the national level. To illustrate the potential pitfalls accompanying this line of reasoning, Bosker (2007: 713) notes that "in areas where many ethnic minorities are living, people tend to vote for right wing political parties. One cannot infer from this observed relationship that ethnic minorities vote more right wing." However reasonable such critiques are, one must be cognizant of the importance that many have assigned to IQ as a measure of intelligence, especially in the non-academic world. Therefore, the public imperative to expose the evidentiary weakness of IRN theory justifies usage of data even when those data may be seriously misinterpreted in other contexts.
In the social sciences, any inter-variate relationship shown to be statistically significant requires theoretical explanation (Babbie 1995: 40) . How do Lynn, Harvey, and Nyborg (2009: 14) account for the supposedly significant relationship between IQ and disbelief? Three potential explanations are offered:
(a) As societies become more "civilized," they come to recognize the inadequacy of religious explanations for natural phenomena.
(b) "More intelligent people are more prone to question irrational or unprovable religious dogmas."
(c) As societies industrialize, the "increasing sense of control over nature diminishes the need for reliance on supernatural powers." (Lynn, Harvey, and Nyborg 2009: 14) Both (a) and (b) presuppose that belief in God is irrational, while (c) assumes that God is a myth created by humankind chiefly to satisfy its supposed desire to control nature. Herein lies one of the principal flaws in the IRN literature: explanations for the supposedly significant relationship between IQ and disbelief are simply assumed. Perhaps the rationality of theism is a philosophical issue that has no place in the scientific literature, in which case it may be considered unfair to criticize the IRN scholars for making such assumptions. Even so, one should at least expect a thoughtful consideration of alternative explanations for individual or group differenc-es in disbelief; otherwise, there is always the possibility that the correlation between IQ and disbelief is spurious. To put it in statistical terms, including appropriate control variables in our models would increase the likelihood that the IRN theory-if, indeed, flawed-would be exposed as such.
Arguably, however, the most conspicuous weakness in the literature is the lack of attention to such potentially confounding explanations. This problem is especially manifest in Lynn, Harvey, and Nyborg's (2009: 14) study, where, in the final section, they make explicit note of, yet fail to control for, two variables that may strongly correlate with disbelief: whether a country is predominantly Roman Catholic, and whether the country has lived under communist rule. In relying on simple bivariate correlations, the authors violate one of the most basic rules of scientific research. The following section provides a more comprehensive discussion of the possible correlates of disbelief.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR DISBELIEF
Exposure to Alternative Views
One of the primary goals of higher education is to foster critical thinking, although tertiary institutions clearly vary in their success in meeting this objective (Tsui 2007 ). In the college or university setting, nothing-not even the most sacred of widely-held beliefs-is to be taken for granted. By its very nature, therefore, higher education encourages one to question the conventional wisdom of his society. It stands to reason, therefore, that tertiary-educated individuals will hold socially unorthodox views with disproportionate frequency. Of course, this implies nothing about the veracity of such views, given the fallibility of human reasoning.
2 If we liken our thought process to a road, at the end of which is our apprehension of truth, we can easily identify a number of potholes that obstruct our path, including cognitive biases, susceptibility to logical fallacies, and insufficient information, to name but a few.
The implication of this simple truth can be expressed in the form of the following maxim: if one is exposed to, and is free to choose amongst, multiple views on a given subject, one of which is actually correct, then he is more likely to endorse an incorrect view than if he were exposed to only the correct view, given the limits of human reasoning. Regarding theism, it is noteworthy that it is accepted by "many people-almost everybody in developmental countries, but also a majority in developed societies" (Nyborg 2009: 82) . Where belief in God is the norm, it should come as no surprise that, especially in societies where individuals are free to choose and promote unconventional views, brighter individuals will be more likely to deviate from this norm. This should be expected as a matter of statistical logic, not because such societies have come to recognize the supposed falsity of theism, for these gifted individuals normally receive higher education 3 and are thus socialized to question such widely-held beliefs. From a theist's perspective, they are, somewhat ironically, more likely to err than their less-educated, theistic counterparts.
The point of this discussion is not in any way to disparage higher education, critical thinking, or freedom, but to spell out their implications for theism. Essentially, a "free market" of ideas, where theism is but one option, has been established in highly educated societies where religious freedom is respected. In historically Christian nations, churches now have to compete with "non-churches . . . for the allegiance of the public" (Chadwick 2002: 353). Chadwick notes further that "Christian practice and morality rested upon customs and language handed down from parents to children. Mostly these had been accepted unquestioningly. When religion was in the market-place acceptance could hardly be so automatic" (ibid.).
Materialism and Belief in God
For the love of money is the root of all evil; it is through this craving that some have wandered away from the faith and pierced their hearts with many pangs.-1 Timothy 6:10
Disbelief may also be a function of economic variables. As Norris and Inglehart explain, for most of the world's population living "at the margin of subsistence, the need for reassurance and a sense of certainty [has been] the main function of religion" (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 231) . Such an explanation is compatible with theism, so long as God is not thereby understood as a mere mythological construct designed to satisfy people's need for security and certainty. 4 From a theistic perspective, economic insecurity simply increases one's awareness of his or her utter dependence on God (rather than causing him or her to adopt what are otherwise absurd beliefs for psychological reasons, as many religious skeptics would have it). This awareness often diminishes in proportion to rising levels of material wealth, hence the reason why Christianity has from its very inception stressed the spiritual dangers of materialism. This study integrates its teachings on this subject for the purpose of constructing a detailed causal theory, consisting of several stages, that links materialism to disbelief.
As early as the New Testament era (e.g., see the parable of the young rich man in Mark 10:17-31), the Christian tradition warned against forming attachments to the material world, and the ascetics steeped in this tradition explicated-with a scientific precision-the causal mechanisms at work in the relationship between materialism and spirituality.
5 According to the fifth-century monk St. Mark the Ascetic, indulgence in material things leads to the acceptance of destructive thought forms (or logismoi) (Mark the Ascetic 1979: 143). As one contemporary elder explains, such thoughts function to "maintain our separation from God" (Markides 2001: 121) . In time, these thoughts may evolve into "passions" (or pathe), which denote appetites or impulses "that violently [dominate] the soul" (Palmer, Sherrard, and Ware 1979: 363 8 observed that these passions blind that which is normally rendered as "intellect" (or nous), or the faculty through which one knows God (Palmer, Sherrard, and Ware 1979: 362) .
To summarize the causal pathway articulated above, materialism appears to encourage the negative thought forms that culminate in passions, which leaves one incapable of truly knowing God. It seems to follow that one whose intellect is so "blinded," as St. Hesychios put it, may ultimately come to doubt the very existence of God. In the ascetic tradition of Christianity, the primary goal of the spiritual life is to encounter God in a direct, mystical way. To this end, the aspiring mystic engages in spiritual exercise (or askesis), which involves prayer, fasting and other practices (Markides 2001: 250) . Through such efforts the believer undergoes a process by which he is purified of all passions. It is through this purification and not rational speculation-with which much of modern Christianity has been increasingly associated-that one attains the direct vision of God (or theoria) that results in an experience-derived faith in God's existence.
To put it boldly,
Those who wish to investigate whether God exists must employ the appropriate methodology which is none other than the purification of the heart from egotistical passions and impurities. If people manage to cleanse their hearts and still fail to see God, then they are justified by concluding that indeed God is a lie. (Markides 2001: 44) In a similar vein, likening askesis to the period in which a silkworm figuratively dies and is reborn as a butterfly, St. Teresa of Ávila evocatively instructs the believer as follows:
Die! Die as the silkworm does when it has fulfilled the office of its creation, and you will see God and be immersed in His
Critiquing the Intelligence-Religiosity Nexus Theory greatness. . . . Understand that when I say "you will see God," I mean in the manner described, in which He manifests Himself in this kind of union. (Teresa of Ávila 2010: 75) As is clear from the above discussion, however, materialism precludes such a mystical encounter (the only basis on which a stable faith in God's existence is built). Hence, as a believer's life becomes increasingly consumed with consumption, 9 the more his or her belief in God comes to rest on the shaky ground of rational speculation, and less on the solid basis of mystical validation. In other words, God's existence becomes a mere and easily replaceable theory, rather than a living reality.
Given that the Christian tradition itself posits such a compelling explanation for the existence of unbelief-in scientific terms, for the positive association of materialism with disbelief in God-it follows that it should accordingly be controlled for in any empirical analysis.
Other Explanations
As previously noted, Lynn, Harvey, and Nyborg (2009: 14) make reference to communist governance and denominational differences as two possible correlates of theistic belief, in addition to intelligence. Their observation that the percentage of atheists is generally lower in Catholic countries than in Protestant countries may be explained, in part, by the peculiarities of the Roman Catholic faith. Höllinger, Haller, and Valle-Höllinger (2007: 137) posit that Catholicism's greater emphasis on rituals and symbols makes the religion "more attractive for the masses, and thus leads to higher levels of religious participation and of religious beliefs as compared with the rationalist theology and the moralist discourse of Protestant Churches."
While some scholars challenge the conventional view that Marxist ideology and religion are essentially incompatible (e.g., see Brentlinger 2000) , the historical record clearly shows open hostility on the part of communist governments towards religion. Therefore, although religious persecution under communism has certainly varied in intensity across time and space, it takes little effort to imagine that life under communist rule would bequeath to societies an enduring legacy of disbelief. To illustrate, in the officially atheist Soviet Union, communists "destroyed churches, mosques, and temples . . . executed religious leaders [and] flooded the schools and media with anti-religious propaganda" (Froese 2004: 35) . These efforts at forced secularization proved so successful that, by the end of the 1930s, "the Russian Orthodox Church had almost ceased to exist, with only 200 of the pre-revolutionary 46,000 churches open, and most of its clergy dead or in labor camps" (Sarkissian 2010: 479 ). It appears that such anti-religious policies have produced lasting effects on current and former communist countries as well. The average percentage of atheists in countries that have lived under communist rule for at least twenty-five years was 18 percent, whereas all other countries displayed a much lower incidence of eight percent.
METHODS
An ordinary least squares (OLS) model is used to evaluate this study's hypotheses, all of which are tested on a group of 99 countries (see the Appendix below for the entire dataset).
10 Although the N is smaller than Lynn, Harvey, and Nyborg's (2009) group of 137 countries, this is offset by the fact that multiple explanations-not solely intelligence-are subjected to empirical scrutiny. Thus, this investigation produces more valid findings than those yielded by Lynn, Harvey, and Nyborg's (2009) overly simple, bivariate test. To correct for heteroscedasticity, the model includes robust standard errors. Table 1 lists each hypothesis examined in this study.
Hypothesis 1:
Intelligence and disbelief in God are unrelated.
Hypothesis 2:
State communism and disbelief in God are positively related.
Hypothesis 3:
Religious freedom and disbelief in God are positively related.
Hypothesis 4:
Tertiary education and disbelief in God are positively related.
Hypothesis 5:
Materialism and disbelief in God are positively related. The first proposition, the null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship, ceteris paribus, between IQ and disbelief, flatly contradicts IRN theory; it is expected that once appropriate controls are included in the model, IQ's significance will diminish. The remaining four hypotheses assess the impact of state communism, religious freedom, tertiary education, and consumption, all of which are expected to correlate positively and significantly with disbelief.
Variables
The dependent variable is operationalized as the percentage of a country's population not believing in God.
11 Like Lynn, Harvey, and Nyborg (2009), this investigation adopts Zuckerman's (2007) cross-national data on disbelief, 12 which were gathered from surveys conducted mostly in 2004, although in a few countries the surveys were carried out a year or two earlier (Lynn, Harvey, and Nyborg 2009: 13) . 13 Regarding the first of three independent variables, World Development Indicators (WDI) data on the percentage of a country's population
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14 For the second, a dummy variable from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project is included to indicate whether a country enjoys religious freedom, 15 which is defined in terms of whether citizens can freely practice their religious beliefs and proselytize other citizens in a non-coercive manner. Lastly, WDI data on household final consumption expenditure per capita (in constant 2000 US dollars) is used to measure materialism.
Dummy variables are added to the model to control for whether Roman Catholics constitute a majority of a country's population, and for whether a country has lived under communist rule for at least a quartercentury. Further, Lynn and Vanhanen's (2006) data on national average IQ are used to control for cross-sectional differences in intelligence. Finally, a conventional measure of economic development, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (in purchasing power parity dollars), is included for the purpose of testing the aforementioned assertion that, as countries grow in wealth, religions will diminish in importance.
RESULTS
Results from the cross-sectional OLS regression are displayed in Table 2 (p. 160). They demonstrate the necessity of controlling for theoreticallyrelevant variables. For, although IQ and disbelief are correlated at nearly .60 (p < .001), this seemingly remarkable relationship vanishes when appropriate controls are added to the model. Among the six variables examined, only IQ had a statistically insignificant coefficient. Hence, these findings support Hypothesis 1, which holds that IQ and disbelief are not significantly related, thus disconfirming IRN theory.
The results also confirm the four other hypotheses. Figure 1 displays the impact of each statistically significant explanatory variable on disbelief.
16 Beginning with the dummy variables, when the majority of a country is comprised of Roman Catholics, the atheist share of the population drops by six percentage points, thus attesting to the importance of denominational differences. Further, communist rule has evidently created a culture of disbelief, as current and former communist countries increase the percentage of disbelievers by ten points. Finally, religious freedom was, as expected, conducive to disbelief, increasing a country's share of atheists by five points.
As for the remaining variables, an increase in the value of tertiary education from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above yields a 7-point increase in disbelief. A similar increase in the value of household consumption produces a 16-point increase, thereby exerting by far the strongest impact on disbelief of all the variables included in the model. Conversely, GDP per capita (not displayed in Table  2 ) was not found to be a significant predictor, nor did it eliminate household consumption's statistical significance. The latter fact suggests that the household consumption measure for materialism is not merely an indirect means of gauging economic development.
Although these findings mark a significant improvement in our understanding of disbelief, as much as 41 percent of the variance in disbelief remains unexplained, as indicated by the model's adjusted R-squared (see above).
17 Therefore, as is discussed in the concluding section, opportunities for further research are clearly evident.
CONCLUSION
The notion that cross-national differences in theistic belief are a function of lower intelligence, reflecting the supposed irrationality of such belief, represents one of the newest challenges to theism. Transcending a simple bivariate analysis, this study is among the first to debunk this claim. It was found that IQ has no significant effect on disbelief when relevant variables are adjusted for. Results indicate that disbelief is significantly greater in countries living under communist rule, and in those in which Roman Catholics do not constitute a majority of the population.
In addition, materialism was shown to be strongly linked to disbelief, thus confirming centuries of Christian spiritual teaching. Finally, higher N 99 *p < .10; **p <.05; ***p < .01 Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.
Table 2: OLS Regression on the Correlates of Disbelief in God
Critiquing the Intelligence-Religiosity Nexus Theory education and religious freedom were both positively and significantly correlated with disbelief. Hence, the results appear to substantiate the theory linking higher education to critical thinking, which inherently entails exposure to multiple views on a given subject. In specific regard to theism, this exposure will, of its own accord, increase the probability that one will reject belief in God, especially in societies where religious freedom is respected.
Future studies might explore what appears to be a mutually influential relationship between materialism and disbelief.
18 Case study analysis could more clearly spell out the causal relationship between these two variables. Additionally, researchers could examine the impact of crossnational differences in religious heterogeneity on disbelief. Likening the religious environment to a free-market economy, Finke and Starke (1992: 19) explain that in the absence of competition from other religious bodies, "monopoly [faiths] tend to be lazy," expending little effort in retaining existing members and attracting new ones. Such approaches could reasonably be applied specifically to theistic belief. Above all, perhaps, is the need to shift the level of analysis to the individual level. Doing so would not only allow researchers to consider factors not yet explored, 19 but would also dodge the aforementioned problems of drawing ecological inferences. *Given missing data on tertiary school enrollment, Germany could not be included in the model.
Notes
I wish to thank the reviewers and editor of the Catholic Social Science Review, Professors John Duffield and Charles Hankla, and Fr. Panayiotis Papageorgiou for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. All mistakes are my own. 1. In this paper, materialism is defined not in terms of the importance that one assigns to the acquisition of material goods, but in terms of the extent to which one actually consumes these goods in excess. For an oft-cited study employing the former definition, see Russell W. Belk, "Materialism: Trait Aspects of Living in the Material World," Journal of Consumer Research 12:3 (1985) : 265-80.
2. As intuition and experience teach us, higher intelligence or education does not guarantee a greater apprehension of truth. Otherwise, there would be no such thing as a scholarly debate (which is a hallmark of social science literature). The fact that scholars, most of whom presumably have above-average IQs, regularly champion irreconcilable claims amply demonstrates the limitations of human reasoning.
3. There is a positive and statistically significant correlation of nearly .81 between higher education (measured as the percentage of a country's population receiving tertiary education) and national average IQ (p < .01).
4. The emotional benefits deriving from theism do not imply its falsity any more than the perceived benefits of exercising moral autonomy disproves atheism.
5. By drawing from Christian ascetical teachings, the intent is to show that the explanation for the reported correlation between IQ and disbelief can be gleaned from the very tradition of the Church, specifically in the wisdom of those who committed themselves to the spiritual life.
6. Insofar as this term can be used interchangeably with "high living," as he calls it.
